Based on the uncertainty theory, market demand information updating as the background, we study the coordination and optimization problem of three-stage supply chain in this paper. In half a asymmetric market information, participants are risk neutral; under the situation of the manufacturers and wholesalers having twice pre-season decision-making opportunity, wholesalers can be replenished in the season; manufacturers join the lowest supply contract of commitment: manufacturers for exchanging the information that they cannot get directly from the market will promise wholesalers to have a season lowest supply in pre-season. According to this contract, we establish optimization models of manufacturers and wholesalers respectively, and get the optimal strategy of supply chain members by analyzing the supply chain system. Finally, by giving a numerical example and comparing the results with that under random circumstances, the result is reasonable.
Introduction
The uncertainty theory [1] has been developed and improved constantly for more than ten years, since Professor Liu Baoding, Tsinghua University and his team put forward it. Its theoretical system was recognized and accepted gradually by the majority of scholars and experts, and part of them have put themselves in studying this theory [2] [3] . At present, axiom system of the theory has been established on the whole, and its theoretical system has been extended to planning theory, risk analysis, reliability analysis, logical reasoning, differential equa-cluding embedded relation, self-compliance, long-term time, the openness of terms, and noted that the safeguards of Relational Contract implementation: value of future cooperation, reputation and relationship rules. In addition, existing researches will also be summarized as follows: Relational Contract as an alternative of formal ones, Governance of Relational Contract, the use of relational contract in incentives. There are more researches on Relational Contracts, such as Zhao Pinghan [20] , Li Ying [21] , Diana Yan Wu [22] , Spengler [23] , Kannan Govindan [24] and so on.
The commitment contract is a typical relational contract. Helper [25] , Dyers and Ouchi [26] , Helper and Sako [27] et al. compared business strategies between the local enterprises and foreign-funded ones in the study and found that the biggest difference was the different commitment quantity and information sharing amount. Obviously they both are related to the trust degree between each other. Studies have shown that the larger commitment quantity and information shared between supply chain members, the lower uncertainties and costs of the entire supply chain will be. Applying its conclusion to the real world, the manufacturer will reduce the number of wholesalers to some extent in order to increase its commitment amount for wholesalers as much as possible without exceeding its production capacity. On the other hand, the wholesaler will improve its degree of information sharing to exchange. Durango-Cohen and Yano [28] studied a commitment contract between ASIC manufacturers and customers, in which the manufacturer would commit a minimum supply quantity to a customer, when he provided a demand forecast and commit to buy some of them at least. Similar commitment contracts are also described in Tsay [29] , Tsay and Lovejoy [30] . Eppen and Iyer [31] have proposed a commitment contract on poor market, in which wholesalers have the right to pay only a part of its order quantity in advance when ordering and then choose to buy the remainder. Bassok [32] , Bassok and Anupindi [33] , Anupindi and Bassok [34] put forward some other commitment contracts in which the wholesalers updating the order quantity once again is allowed. Their application avoids the possibility of wholesalers exaggerating the market demand deliberately to a certain extent when sharing information and too low production of manufacturers.
Aiming to seasonal products with long production cycle, short sales period, unknown demand and large volatility, combining with the previous researches on the supply chain coordination with market demand information updates and based on the uncertainty theory, this paper further deepens and expands the application of commitment contract, which is a kind of relational contract, in the supply chain management. Based on the general newsboy model with uncertainty demand, this paper gives a two-stage supply chain model in case of market demand information updating and establishes the appropriate decision-making model from the perspective of the supply chain members (the manufacturer and the wholesaler) respectively, and then optimizes the corresponding supply chain contract with updating information from the two aspects.
Based on the lowest supply commitment contract, this paper establishes a two-stage three-stage supply chain system made up of a manufacturer and a wholesaler firstly: before the season beginning, the wholesaler and the manufacturer carry on the first time "blind" production and order. With the season coming, the wholesaler corrects the order quantity while he provides demand information with certain loyalty to the manufacturer. At the same time, the manufacturer of production revised inventory and promised the lowest supply. After the season beginning, the wholesaler can carry on replenishing once again according to the situation. Based on the supply chain above, this paper establishes the optimal decision model for the manufacturer and the wholesaler respectively and ultimately gets the wholesaler's optimal order quantity, the value of the manufacturer's optimal commitment, the optimal production quantity and other strategic decisions. Finally, it gives exponential analysis and obtains a more realistic conclusion.
Preliminary Model

Symbol Description
p : The market price of the commodity. 
provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite. 
Based on the newsboy model, a production enterprise with unit production costs C, unit retail price P(P > C), D is stochastic market demand that policy makers facing.
( ) F x and ( ) f x are noted that uncertain distribution function and uncertain density function of the uncertain demand respectively. So the optimization model that makers use to choose the optimal inventory Q is
Calculating its derivative, we get
It means that ( ) Y Q is concave function of Q . If we let the optimal inventory that makers chosed
, the final optimal profits of decision makers is
In the situation that information of market demand is uncertain and updating, as manufacturers can't contact with the market, they get the updated information only through information sharing with wholesalers. Note e x as the market updates wholesalers get and e x is that they provide to manufacturers, so we have e e x x ≥ . Phase 1: Manufacturers and wholesalers confirm uncertainty distribution of market demand with years of experience in sales and expert assessment, denoting as 
With the sales season starting, we can get the market demand x, wholesalers selectively emit replenishment orders to manufacturers to resive the final order quantity according to the total order quantity d and demand x. As a manufacturer, they can only mechanically do their ability to distribute the surplus goods to wholesalers as complement goods. If the market needs are not met, give manufacturers and wholesalers s punishment considering loss from the customer, loss of reputation and so on. It is called shortage punishment.
Known from the above analysis, for a manufacturer, the quantity he committed must be greater than the wholesalers amount in the first two stages, that is, C d ≥ . Taking 3 order opportunities into consideration, after the sales seasons beginning, the order quantity wholesalers expected is
. However, because of manufacturers' limited production, the quantity is
In addition, to be fair, shortage punishment of the contract allocates the responsibility in detail. Wholesalers shoulder the responsibility
that caused by understanding updates insufficiently. That caused by limited production is
Wholesalers take initiative relatively in the supply chain system and manufacturers make decisions due to the behavior of wholesalers. We assume that wholesalers know the manufacturers different responses to different 
The Optimization Model of Manufacturers Based on That Commitment Contract with Changing Demand Information
Known from a series of analysis above, we should set about from manufacturers. Obviously the order quantities were known in the two production decisions, so 1
The total profit of manufacturers is noted as 
It should be noted that manufacturers need not make any decisions in phase III, the producers do not need to make any decisions considering the collaboration process in the entire supply chain. Decomposing the expression by the stages of production decision and combining stage II and stage III, we can get the optimization model of manufacturer's expected profits in this situation: 
In which, (ii) When 
That is, In this case, since the total production has exceeded the amount of updating information e x , for manufacturers it is not necessary to increase the loyalty punishment. That is, 
In which 
d min , . 
Optimization Model of Wholesalers with Demand Information Updates Based on the Commitment Contract
Relative to the manufacturers and wholesalers have been in a dominant position throughout the entire supply chain operation process. They take the initiate to carry on two pre-season orders, obtain the market information directly, selectively share it with the manufacturer, and understand the manufacturer's response to update information. That is, they now how the manufacturer correct the demand distribution function ( ) e f x x according to updated information. Though further analysis, we can get ( ) 
Here r Π notes gross profit of the wholesaler and p notes the selling price. As a wholesaler, while having a larger initiative, but he has no room to make a decision in the third stage replenishment again and can only compensate the shortage possible mechanically. So explode the expression by the production phase, we get the following optimization model of wholesalers 
in which 
Proof: Simplify the decision problem and get 
It is necessary to pay attention to that r Ψ is related to d directly and explicitly, but generate indirect hidden relationship with e x by influencing C and q. Here we assume that wholesalers have the ability to find the completion in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, 
In this case, in order to maximize r Ψ , the more d is the better. So we get 
Here the second term and the fourth one are independent of d. 
And we can get further ( ) 
In the similar way, we obtain the optimal decision is ( ) If e x d > , we have ( ) 
whose the last term is independent of d. 
Optimization Analysis of Supply Chain Based on the Commitment Contract with Information Updates
From the analysis in above part 2 and part 3, we get that in order to achieve coordination, supply chain should have the following conclusions, when the commitment amount C satisfy certain conditions. Completion 1: Under the condition C = q, when e d q x ≤ ≤ , the supply chain could achieve coordination in the case of q = d, while it could not achieve coordination in the case of ≠ q d . On the other hand, when e x q ≤ , the supply chain could achieve coordination in the case of q = d, while it could not achieve coordination in the case of q d ≠ . Proof: Under the condition C = q when e d q x ≤ ≤ , the manufacturer's optimal production quantity is q < ). The wholesaler's optimal order quantity is less than optimal production of the manufacturer, so they can not be equal. Therefore the supply chain coordination can not be achieved. Similarly, in the case of q d ≠ and e x d > , the wholesaler's optimal order quantity is d (
. The wholesaler's optimal order quantity is less than optimal production of the manufacturer, so they can not be equal. Therefore the supply chain coordination can not be achieved. QED Known from the above two completion and above analysis, when the manufacturer's optimal production is larger than the wholesaler's optimal order quantity, it is impossible to achieve optimal state of both of two members of the supply chain. Only one of them can be optimal, and the other will have some extra expense. In order to achieve the supply chain coordination, deduce more costs the other member paid from the more part of the profit the optimal member get than that without cooperation and the two members negotiate to allocate this part profits. Then the supply chain coordination can be achieved; when the manufacturer's production is equal to the wholesaler's order quantity, the supply chain coordination can be achieved. The two sides can reach optimal state under some conditions.
On the other hand, the total profits of the manufacturer is ( )
min , . This completion is to reach the optimal supply chain coordination in the case of q = d. It is similar with the process of get the optimal order quantity ,
Exponential Analysis
We assume that before market information updates, the manufacturer and wholesaler analyze and estimate that the market demand obey the normal uncertainty distribution In this case, some costs will be generated, such as shortage cost. Comparing the three cases above, we get the first one is the optimal and its cost is the lowest. In addition, if complete the previous analyzed based on the probability theory, its result in the first case is as follows:
As a manufacturer, ( ) In this case, some costs will be generated, such as shortage cost. Compared with results obtained in the previous uncertainty theory, the optimal production value of the manufacturer's is less slightly and the optimal value of wholesalers is less than the previous value. The calculation is similar in the other two cases, so here we do not compare them.
Conclusion
Based on the uncertainty theory, this paper studies seasonal merchandise with long production cycle, relatively short marketing period, uncertain and strong volatile market demand. Setting about the perspective of market demand information updated, it analyzes the contract coordination problem of a two-stage three-stage supply chain system with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-neutral wholesaler. In the system of pure contract supply chain, it cannot achieve coordination. It introduces the pledge contract, in the case that producers have twice pre-season production and wholesalers have twice pre-season order and a replenishment opportunity in the season. It established contract model respectively, and according to these models, it carried on the optimization analysis. The optimal quantity, the output of eugenics and the optimal amount of commitment of the supply chain members are presented. In the case of the wholesalers predomination, it gives the information sharing strategies that regulate the supply chain. In this paper, it is just an attempt to apply the uncertainty theory in supply chain. There may also be many problems, but after all, it has been applied to the practical problem. I believe it will be applied to analyze the supply chain system by more researchers.
